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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
Star Mi7ling Co.,9 the court held that the trade mark would be
protected only in the market where it was actually used and a
more recent decision 0 applied the same theory to a mark registered
under the federal statute.
The court in the principal case thought it proper to enforce
the covenant as to the territory where plaintiff actually did busiJaess without considering whether the full territorial restriction
was excessive. The authorities permit that procedure, however,
only where the covenant is by its very terms divisible, which was
not the case here so far as the facts appear in the opinion." To
enforce an illegal indivisible covenant within the outer bounds
of reasonableness not only makes the contract of the parties over
but also leaves the covenantee free to impose as extensive restrictions as he pleases since he could expect a court to grant
him all the protection the law allows in any event.12
-RUDOLPH

E.

HAGBERG.

CE OF CoNINSURANCE - STATUTES - ADmISSmiLTY OF EVmW
VICTION OF NoN-FLoN ous KILIG OF INsURE By BENE CIARY.

wife, sole distributee, and beneficiary of a life insurance
-A
policy killed her husband, the insured, and was convicted of involuntary manslaughter. Insurer sued as stakeholder to dispose of
the proceeds of the policy. Since the wife's conviction was for less
than a felony, she sought to introduce the criminal judgment in
the civil suit to establish her claim to the proceeds on the theory

a 240 U. S. 403, 36 S. Ct. 357 (1916) (Common law result). Mr. Justice
Holmes, in a separate concurring opinion, said that the protection should be
state wide in every state where the trade mark was used unless the common
law of the state were found to require a different result.
lo U. S. Printing Co. v. Griggs Cooper & Co., 278 U. S. 592, 49 S. Ct. 267
(1928); discussed in Note (1929) 24 ILL. L. RV. 474, in which it is suggested that where the mark is so registered, it should be protected over the
entire United States. A trade mark registered in West Virginia is given state
wide protection. W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 47, art. 1, § 2 et seg.
11 This distinction is recognized in the cases relied upon by the court in
West Virginia Transportation Co. v. Ohio River Pipe Line Co., 22 W. Va. 600,
622 (1883), in rendering the dictum relied upon in the present case. So it
was in the leading case of Price v. Green, 16 M. & W. 346, 153 Eng. Repr.
1222 (1847), and Oregon Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 20 Wall. 64, 22 L.
Ed. 315 (1874).

12 See Mason v. Provident Clothing and Supply Co., Ltd., (1913) A. C. 724,
745. If divisible, but part of the covenant is unenforceable for uncertainty,
relief should be given as to the valid portion. See Standard Fashion Co. v.
Magrane Houston Co., 251, Fed. 559 (C. C. A. 1st, 1918). But see Feenaughty v. Beall, 91 Ore. 654, 178 Pac. 600 (1919).
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that it was admissible by implication under a statute' rendering
the conviction of a fel6nious killing conclusive evidence in bar.
Held, the statute bars the right and makes conviction conclusive
in the civil suit only where the beneficiary is convicted of feloniously
killing the insured, but does not otherwise change the common
law rule, and no reference to the criminal judgment can be made
in the civil suit. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Hill.2
The rule, apart from statute, is that a beneficiary who has
feloniously3 killed the insured cannot take; some courts add that
the killing must be intentional and wrongful 4 to operate as a bar.
If the killing must be intentional to operate as a bar, it follows
that involuntary manslaughter 5 will not preclude the beneficiary
from obtaining the proceeds.'
Statutes have been passed regulating the subject. These
statutes expressly prevent the beneficiary from obtaining the proceeds where he has unlawfully 7 or feloniously" killed the insured.
Statutes like that of West Virginia render it unnecessary to prove
the homicide by independent evidence where there has been a
conviction. 9
1'W. VA. Rnv. CODE (1931) c. 42, art. 4, § 2. " ....
No person who has
been convicted of feloniously killing another .... shall take or acquire any
money .... from the one killed, .... either by descent and distribution,
.... or by any policy or certificate of insurance, or otherwise; but the money
.... to which the person so convicted would otherwise have been entitled shall
go to the person or persons who would have taken the same if the person so
convicted had been dead at the date of the death of the one killed or conspired
against, unless by some rule of law or equity the money or the property would
pass to some other person or persons."
2177 S.E. 188 (W. Va. 1934).
a N. Y. Mutual v. Armstrong, 117 U. S. 591, 6 S.Ct. 877 (1886) ; Anderson
v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 152 N. C. 1, 67 S.E. 53 (1910); Schmidt v. Northern
Life Ass'n, 112 Iowa 41, 83 N. W. 800 (1900); Slocum v. Metropolitan Life,
245 Mass. 565, 139 N. E. 816 (1923).
4 See discussion of requirements that the killing be intentional and wrongful
in Grossman, Liability and Bights of the Insurer W~hen the Death of the Insured
Is Caused by the Beneficiary or by an Assignee (1930) 10 B. U. L. REv.
281, 287.
5"The absence of intention to kill or to commit any unlawful act which
might reasonably produce death or great bodily harm is the distinguishing feature between voluntary and involuntary homicide."
State v. Weisengoff, 85
W. Va. 271, 284, 101 S.E. 450 (1919).
6 See Schreiner v. High Court, 35 Ill. App. 576 (1890).
"No homicide which
is the result of carelessness, or which is not an intentional killing should bar
plaintiff's rights to the money on her certificate."
7D. C. CODE (1924) c. 11, § 961; NEB. Coup. STAT. (1922) § 1239; OKLA.
REv. L ws (1921) § 11319; S. C. Laws 1924, no. 726, § 1, ("Unlawfully
killing" - "except in cases of involuntary manslaughter").
s IoWA ConE (1927) § 12033; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 8734; Wyo.
Coup.

STAT.

CoMp.

STAT.

AsNN. (1920) § 7010; ORE. LAWS (Olson, 1920)

§

10140; TEX.

(1928) art. 5047 (wilfully bringing about death of insured).
9D. C. CODE (1924) c. 11, § 961; NEB. COMp. STAT. (1922) § 1239; OKr.A.

REV. LAWS (1921)

§

11319; W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) C. 42, art. 4,
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The statute in the principal case is subject to more than one
construction. The view taken by the court is that the statute is
primarily concerned with the distribution of the proceeds of the
policy and only as a secondary matter makes a felonious conviction conclusive in the civil trial, but does not otherwise alter
the existing common law on the subject. 0 Analogous statutes in
the field of administrative law"' and torts' 2 have been construed to
be all-embracing and thus to supplant completely the common law
on the subject. 13 Such a construction is not unknown in this jurisdiction,14 but it is hardly appropriate to the statute under inquiry
since its major emphasis is upon the fact of conviction of felonious
killing as a bar to succeeding to the property or receiving the insurance of the decedent.
Were the common law otherwise repealed a beneficiary who
had feloniously killed an insured, but had not been convicted of
the crime, would be allowed to take,"- an absurd result not required by the language of the statute. It is not perceived, in any
event, that to interpret the enactment as all-embracing would lead
to a different conclusion in the principal case because its effect
would be to admit evidence of conviction of felonious slaying and
not of any lesser crime to bar the claimant. Thus it would leave
unaffected as to lesser crimes the West Virginia rule excluding
10 In Smith v. Todd, 155 S. C. 322, 156 S.E. 506 (1930), the court held the
statute merely extended the common law on the subject.
11 The state claimed as a preferred creditor in the liquidation of an insolvent
trust company contending that the statute being silent on the subject, the
common law was still in effect. (See Marshall v. New York, 254 U. S. 380,
41 S. Ct. 143 [1920], holding that the state had a prerogative preference at
common law.) The court held: "IIt is a general principal that the enactment
of administrative law, impliedly repeals the statutes and supersedes the common law theretofore governing the subject. "I Com 'r of Banks v. Highland Trust
Co., 283 Mass. 71, 186 N. E. 229 (1933); Knowlton v. Swampscott, 280 Mass.
09, 181 I. E. 849 (1932).
12 Boston Ice Co. v. Boston Ry.Co., 76 N. H. 6, 86 Atl. 356 (1913) ; Graves
Cent. Ry.Co., 126 Tenn. 148, 148 S. W. 239 (1912).
v. Ill.
13 The doctrine of construing a statute as designed to cover an entire field
and abrogate the common law on the subject is well defined in the case of
In re Lord & Polk Chemical Co., 7 Del. Ch. 248, 44 AtI. 775 (1895), the court
saying: "Also, if the legislation undertakes to provide for the regulation of
human conduct in respect to a specific matter or thing already covered by the
common law, and parts of which are omitted from the statute, such omissions
may be taken generally as evidences of the legislative intent to repeal or abrogate the same."
14 The doctrine though not pertinent to the decision was recognized by the
court, citing In re Lord & Polk Chemical Co., supra n. 13. Raleigh County Bank
v. Poteet, 74 W. Va. 511, 515, 82 S. E. 332 (1914).
15 See Burns v. Cope, 182 Ind. 289, 105 N. E. 471 (1914), where the court
construed a statute, providing that a person could not take property by descent
who had been convicted of unlawfully causing the death of another, to mean
that he could take unless so convicted.
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evidence of criminal convictions in civil cases.16 However insupportable that rule may be, it is strongly entrenched judicially and
we may expect it to be relaxed only through legislation 7 upon the
very subject and not by remote implication.
Under the common law test of the instant decision an unlawful intentional non-felonious slayer would be barred from taking
the proceeds. While an unlawful intentional homicide, not felonious
in character, is not conceivable,"' yet if such a result could be
reached in the criminal trial, the statute as construed by the court
would not govern the distribution of the proceeds. Were the killing
unintentional the beneficiary should prevail both at law and in
equity.
-HOUSTON A. Sm=r.

Om AND GAS -

CONSTRuc iON OF DRmiL oR PAY COVENANT FOR

FURTHER DEVELOPEENT -

EFFECT OF PAYMNT OF DELAY RENTALs.

A covenant in an oil and gas lease required the lessee to drill a
well within one year, and if that well was a paying and producing
well which would deliver at least ninety thousand feet of gas daily
into the line, the lessee was to drill a second well within twentyfour months or pay rentals quarterly thereon. The first well was
drilled and produced gas. On being requested by the plaintiff
lessor, a year later, to take action under the covenant as to further
development, the lessee began paying rentals. The defendant who
had come into possession of the lease by assignment ceased payment, whereupon the plaintiff brought this suit for rentals due
and unpaid. HelU the covenant was operative if at any reasonable time after its completion, the first well was capable of delivering the required amount of gas into the line, but the payment of
rentals by the lessee constituted an election which bars the defendant from raising non-occurrence of the contingency as a de-

16 Interstate Dry Goods Stores v. Williamson, 91 W. Va. 156, 112 S. E. 301
(1922); Shires v. Boggess, 72 W. Va. 109, 77 S. E. 542 (1912). See Note
(1924) 31 A. L. R. 262.
17 The rule has not been frequently relaxed by judicial decision. In Eagle
S. & B. D. Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 142 S. E. 314 (1927), the court held
that the criminal judgment against the defendant is res adjudicataas to him
in the civil trial. See admitting such judgment as prima facie evidence in the

civil trial, but saying that further departures must be by legislation, Schindler
v. Royal Ins. Co., 258 N. Y. 310, 179 N. E. 711 (1932).
is An unintentional (i. e., a negligent) killing might be wrongful though not
necessarily felonious.
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